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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2002 Brian Bartholomew was charged with possession of
methamphetamine.1 In hopes of obtaining leniency, Bartholomew chose to
assist the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force as a confidential informant.2
As an informant, Bartholomew arranged to buy drugs from Afton Callahan
at Callahan’s home.3 Bartholomew then contacted narcotics officers to set
up the sting operation.4 As part of the sting operation, Bartholomew
entered Callahan’s home with Callahan’s consent and proceeded to buy
drugs.5 After making the exchange with Callahan, Bartholomew signaled
narcotics officers, who then entered and arrested Callahan.6
At first glance the arrest appears to be an everyday, straightforward law
enforcement tactic, but actually the situation poses a difficult constitutional
problem: Was the entry by the police officers in Callahan authorized when
the Fourth Amendment requires police officers to be authorized by
warrant, consent, or exigent circumstances to enter a home? If Callahan
gave his consent to Bartholomew, a civilian, can that consent be passed to
law enforcement? On July 16, 2007, Callahan appealed to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals, alleging that the police officers violated his
constitutional rights when they entered his home.7 The state conceded there
was no warrant or exigent circumstances authorizing the officers’ entry
into Callahan’s home.8 Instead, the state relied on the consent-onceremoved doctrine to establish the officers’ authority to enter and arrest
Callahan.9
The consent-once-removed doctrine allows one individual to receive
consent from the homeowner and then pass that consent to another
individual, who can then legally enter the home to assist the first
individual.10 Traditionally, the concept has been applied only to undercover
1. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 893 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds,
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 894. Callahan brought a civil action against the counties and cities involved and the
individual officers who made the arrest. He alleged that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated
when the police raided his home. The district court held that his rights were violated, but the
officers were afforded qualified immunity. Id. The Tenth Circuit, upon review, affirmed that the
rights were violated, but reversed the qualified immunity holding, finding that the officers relied on
rights that were not clearly established. Id. at 898–99.
8. Id. at 896.
9. Id.
10. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995)); accord United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806
(6th Cir. 2005).
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officers who received the initial consent,11 but cases like Callahan’s pose
the question of whether this doctrine is valid when extended to confidential
informants.12
In Callahan’s case, the Tenth Circuit considered extending the consentonce-removed doctrine to include consent obtained by a confidential
informant. Ultimately, however, the court declined to extend the doctrine
to civilians and instead held that consent to a confidential informant is
insufficient under the Fourth Amendment to allow police officers to enter a
home.13 This decision created a circuit split in the application of the
doctrine and proves the need for a clear answer to the question of whether
the consent-once-removed doctrine should be extended to situations
involving confidential informants.14
This Note examines the establishment and history of the consent-onceremoved doctrine from its conceptual basis to its current level of
acceptance. Part II outlines the basic Fourth Amendment concepts that
underlie the consent-once-removed doctrine. Part III looks more
specifically at the definition of the doctrine and its gradual formation over
the past thirty years, as well as its current application to undercover
officers. Part IV looks more critically at the issues posed by the extension
of the doctrine to confidential informants, including analysis of the
inherent differences between a confidential informant and an undercover
officer, and the subsequent constitutional effects of those differences.
Finally, Part V concludes that the consent-once-removed doctrine should
be extended to situations involving confidential informants and that this
extension is constitutional.
II. CONCEPTUAL BASIS FOR THE DOCTRINE: COMPETING
BACKGROUND PRINCIPLES
The Callahan case illustrates the consent-once-removed doctrine and
the attenuating issues involved in its extension to confidential informants.15
Callahan exemplifies the fundamental principles that are in direct conflict:
the basic privacy right of an individual to be free from unreasonable
intrusion in his own home and the established concept of waiving, through
consent, the right to this expected protection.
11. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Diaz,
814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Samet, 794 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D. Va. 1992);
Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
12. See Yoon, 398 F.3d at 806; Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856; United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d
645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986); Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 766 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
13. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 898.
14. Compare Callahan, 494 F.3d at 898 (rejecting the application of the doctrine to
confidential informants), with Yoon, 398 F.3d at 808 (treating confidential informants the same as
undercover officers), and Paul, 808 F.2d at 648 (extending doctrine to confidential informants).
15. The Callahan case also presents the issue of the informant’s character, which is typically
questionable. See infra Part IV.B.4.
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A. The Warrant Requirement
The Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution provides distinct
protection for the security of a citizen’s privacy in his home.16 In particular,
the Amendment provides that the American people have the right “to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures . . . and no Warrants shall issue but upon probable
cause . . . .”17 The Supreme Court determined in Payton v. New York18 that
this language prohibits police entry into a person’s home to make a felony
arrest without a warrant.19 The Court in Katz v. United States reasoned that
the Constitution requires the impartial decision of a judicial officer to step
between the citizen and the police.20 The Katz Court stated further that a
search absent judicial approval is per se unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment,21 subject to only a few specific exceptions.22 One of these
exceptions, consent, establishes the initial basis for the consent-onceremoved doctrine and its possible extension.23 Importantly, however, the
Supreme Court has cautioned that exceptions to the warrant requirement
are “few in number and carefully delineated.”24
16. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586–87 (1980) (stating “[i]t is a ‘basic principle
of Fourth Amendment law’ that searches and seizures inside a home without a warrant are
presumptively unreasonable,” while “objects . . . found in a public place may be seized by the police
without a warrant”); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 474–75 (1971) (stating “[i]t is
accepted, at least as a matter of principle, that a search or seizure carried out on a suspect’s premises
without a warrant is per se unreasonable, unless the police can show that it falls within one of a
carefully defined set of exceptions based on the presence of ‘exigent circumstances’”).
17. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
19. Id. at 576.
20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S.
471, 481–82 (1963).
21. 389 U.S. at 357; see also Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610, 614–15 (1961)
(noting that the Fourth Amendment requires a detached magistrate to determine the issuance of a
search warrant and that attempts by officers to search without a warrant “would reduce the
Amendment to a nullity”); Rios v. United States, 364 U.S. 253, 261 (1960) (stating “[t]he seizure
can survive constitutional inhibition only upon a showing that the surrounding facts brought it
within one of the exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a search warrant.”); Jones v.
United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958) (“The exceptions to the rule that a search must rest upon a
search warrant have been jealously and carefully drawn . . . .”).
22. Various exceptions to the warrant requirement have been recognized, such as consent and
exigent circumstances. Exigent circumstances involve an emergency situation which justifies the
police’s warrantless entry or search. Exigent circumstances that have appeared more often include:
1) degree of urgency and amount of time necessary to obtain a warrant, 2) reasonable belief that the
contraband is about to be removed, 3) possibility of danger to police officers, 4) information
indicating that the possessors of contraband are aware that the police are on their trail, and 5) the
ready destructibility of the contraband. United States v. Rubin, 474 F.2d 262, 265–66 (3d Cir.
1973); see also Dorman v. United States, 435 F.2d 385, 390–93 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (providing similar
list of relevant factors for determining existence of exigent circumstances exception).
23. See United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that the first entry
was valid through consent and extending that consent to the second entry); United States v. Paul,
808 F.2d 645, 647–48 (7th Cir. 1986).
24. United States v. United States District Court for the E.D. of Mich., 407 U.S. 297, 318
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B. Exception to the Warrant Requirement: Consent Through
Deception
The consent exception is routinely thought of as a valuable alternative
to the warrant requirement.25 Not only does the use of consent avoid the
complex process of obtaining a warrant, but it can also be used to search
even when there is no probable cause.26 The basic concept of the consent
exception is that a person may waive the protection from unreasonable
searches and seizures. Prior to 1973 many courts thought that a valid
consent could be given only when the consenter knew he had the right to
refuse consent.27 Then, in 1973, the Supreme Court in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte held that the consenter’s ignorance of the right to refuse
consent was only one factor in the determination of valid consent.28 Thus
today a “totality of the circumstances” test exists, which focuses on
whether the consent was voluntary.29 There is no need to ensure that the
consenter knows of his right to refuse and therefore, law enforcement may
obtain consent through deception.
In fact, an effective tool for police in obtaining consent is through a
misrepresentation of the officer’s identity.30 Commonly this tactic involves
undercover officers posing as potential narcotics purchasers, similar to the
factual situation in Callahan v. Millard County.31 The Supreme Court in
Hoffa v. United States directly addressed the constitutionality of this issue
(1972); see also Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192 (1990) (“The Court has often heard, and
steadfastly rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the warrant requirement for
searches of the home . . . .”); Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 749 (1984); Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.
25. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 8.1 (4th ed. 2004) (discussing advantages of
consent over obtaining a warrant as the burdensome constitutional and statutory requirements which
attend the issuance and execution of a search warrant, and that in some cases search based on
consent can allow for a somewhat broader search, and the overall expediency effect of consent on
the investigation).
26. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973) (stating “one of the specifically
established exceptions to the requirements of both a warrant and probable cause is a search that is
conducted pursuant to consent”); see also State v. Zachodni, 466 N.W.2d 624, 628 (S.D. 1991).
27. Courts were confused as to whether consent to search was a matter of voluntariness or
whether it involved an actual waiver of the Fourth Amendment rights. LAFAVE, supra note 25,
§ 8.1, at 8. Compare Zap v. United States, 328 U.S. 624, 628 (1946) (appearing to focus on
voluntariness), with United States v. Nikrasch, 367 F.2d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 1966) (applying
knowing waiver standard to consent searches).
28. 412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973) (“While the state of the accused’s mind, and the failure of the
police to advise the accused of his rights, were certainly factors to be evaluated in assessing the
‘voluntariness’ of an accused’s responses, they were not in and of themselves determinative.”).
29. Id. at 226.
30. See Lewis v. United States, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966) (stating that the elimination of the
use of deception by police would “severely hamper the Government in ferreting out those organized
criminal activities that are characterized by covert dealings with victims who either cannot or do not
protest. A prime example is provided by the narcotics traffic”).
31. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 893–94 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other
grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
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and firmly stated that at no time has the Court held “that the Fourth
Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s misplaced belief that a person to
whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it.”32 In
Lewis v. United States the Court further stated that when the home of an
individual is “converted into a commercial center . . . for purposes of
transacting unlawful business,” those transactions should be treated no
differently than if they occurred in open public.33 This language has been
cited by at least two courts as evidence of the validity of the consent-onceremoved doctrine.34 Conclusively, in Lewis, the Court made clear that the
consent provided through deception is valid and that to hold otherwise
would unreasonably deem any action by an undercover officer as per se
unconstitutional.35 Thus, Lewis is dispositive on the issue of deception and
undercover officers.36
III. DEFINING THE DOCTRINE
A. Development and the Present Status of the Consent-Once-Removed
Doctrine
Presently, the consent-once-removed doctrine is recognized in some
form by four circuit courts and two state supreme courts.37 In addition,
many other state and federal courts have considered either the base
concepts of the doctrine or the doctrine itself.38 Generally, these courts
32. 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966). This concept is an important foundation for the consent-onceremoved doctrine, as it accounts for the completion of the first element of the doctrine. See United
States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000).
33. 385 U.S. 206, 211 (1966).
34. State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 132 (N.J. 1993); United States v. Samet, 794 F. Supp. 178,
182 (E.D. Va. 1992).
35. Lewis, 385 U.S. at 210. Some opinions, such as the dissent in Henry, have noted that in
Lewis no evidence was seized as a result of a warrantless entry and thus, the case does not authorize
seizure of evidence beyond what was originally purchased during the undercover buy. Henry, 627
A.2d at 134 (O’Hern, J., dissenting).
36. See United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 749 (1971) (concluding that Lewis is still good
law); United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (citing Lewis as evidence that
it is well-settled that undercover officers may lawfully misrepresent their identity).
37. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds,
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009); United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648–49 (6th
Cir. 2000); Bramble, 103 F.3d at 1478; United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir.
1995); Henry, 627 A.2d at 130–32; State v. Johnston, 518 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Wis. 1994) (citing
Diaz and Paul and recognizing the doctrine, but not adopting the term “consent-once-removed”).
38. See Samet, 794 F. Supp. at 181. The Samet court, facing a typical undercover narcotics
purchase by an officer, used the doctrine and opined a straightforward application:
[The detective] was lawfully in the apartment, and no one disputed that he had the
authority and probable cause to arrest defendants upon the exchange of the cash
for the cocaine. The arrest did not become unlawful merely because [the
detective], as an undercover agent, first signaled the arrest team to assist him.
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approve the doctrine based on the view that, where the first entry is
obtained through valid consent, the second entry is a mere technicality and
sufficiently justified.39 Earlier cases that validated entry based on similar
reasoning as the consent-once-removed doctrine were termed “second
entry” cases.40 For example, United States v. Janik, decided in 1983,
approved the “second entry” concept.41 Judge Posner’s opinion in Janik
exemplifies the early reasoning that preceded the consent-once-removed
doctrine.42 Judge Posner parsed the issue into a discussion of two separate
entries.43 First, the initial undercover officer’s entry was lawful because he
received valid consent.44 Second, the entry of back-up officers was
dismissed as being “trivial” in its privacy implications because of the
previously-established consent given to the undercover officer.45
Similarly, in a natural progression towards the adoption of the doctrine,
Id.; see also United States v. Schuster, 684 F.2d 744, 748 (11th Cir. 1982) (reasoning that consent
could be passed to agent but not addressing the doctrine); Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 768 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (relying on Schuster, the court allowed consent to be passed from confidential
informant to agent but did not explicitly mention the doctrine); Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d
406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (relying on Diaz and United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537 (7th Cir.
1983), the court formally adopts the consent-once-removed doctrine); Johnston, 518 N.W.2d at 765
n.6 (declining to adopt doctrine but acknowledging that the doctrine is very similar to its present
analysis).
Florida’s case law provides another example of the natural development of the concepts
underlying the doctrine, though not explicitly adopting consent-once-removed. In Lawrence v.
State, undercover officers received consent to enter the defendants’ home and then witnessed
contraband in plain view. 388 So. 2d 1250, 1251–52 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980). One of the officers then
left and elicited back-up officers to arrest the defendants. Id. at 1252. The court’s majority found
that the undercover officer and back-up officers who reentered still had valid consent and thus the
departed officer’s reentry was constitutional. Id. The concurring opinion by Judge Anstead, later
adopted in State v. Schwartz, 398 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), gives an even more
noticeable identification of the doctrine as it stands today. Lawrence, 388 So. 2d at 1253 (Anstead,
J., concurring). “In my view once the defendants admitted the undercover police officers to their
premises and proceeded to openly engage in criminal conduct in the officers’ presence they could
not thereafter claim any violation of their reasonable expectation of privacy . . . .” Id.
39. See, e.g., Janik, 723 F.2d at 548 (reasoning that the subsequent entry of other officers
makes no difference from a constitutional standpoint); Schuster, 684 F.2d at 748–49 (stating that
the entry of additional agent did not change the fact that the defendant was engaged in illegal
activity and could not reasonably expect secrecy in his activities); Schwartz, 398 So. 2d at 462
(finding that the entry of other officers does not bear on the reasonableness or do injustice to the
Constitution).
40. United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 n.4 (7th Cir. 1987) (terming both White and
Janik as “second entry” cases).
41. 723 F.2d 537, 547–48 (7th Cir. 1983).
42. Janik was cited by multiple courts in their establishment of the consent-once-removed
doctrine. See, e.g., United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 810 (6th Cir. 2005); Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at
856; United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986).
43. Janik, 723 F.2d at 547–48.
44. Id. at 547.
45. Id. at 548.
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the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. Schuster,46 allowed a transfer of
consent from an informant to a government agent.47 The Eleventh Circuit
relied on prior Supreme Court wiretap cases establishing a “misplaced
trust” theory.48 The wiretap cases allowed an informant to tape record
private conversations and transmit them to agents.49 In both cases, the
Court held that the speaker’s privacy interest was no longer protected from
subsequent broadcast of the conversations.50 The Schuster majority likened
that situation to the warrantless entry of an individual’s home based upon
an informant receiving valid consent.51 The court justified the warrantless
entry by focusing on the depreciated privacy interest and the
reasonableness of the search or seizure.52
The first case to term the doctrine and specifically set its parameters
was United States v. Diaz.53 Diaz’s basic reasoning built on the Seventh
Circuit’s previous holding in United States v. Paul54 and Janik, which
emphasized the trivial nature of the privacy interests involved in the
second entry.55 In Diaz, an undercover officer received valid consent to
enter a suspect’s hotel room and after establishing probable cause, signaled
the entry of back-up officers to make the arrest.56 The defendant was
convicted on multiple counts and appealed the warrantless police entry.57
In finding law enforcement actions constitutional, the court observed that
the purpose of a warrant is to prevent unwarranted intrusions, but here the
intrusion had already taken place by the first officer legally entering with

46. 684 F.2d 744 (11th Cir. 1982).
47. Id. at 748.
48. Id.
49. See generally United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979) (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect against recording of consensual conversations or rebroadcast of those
conversations to government agents); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971) (holding that the
monitoring of conversations without a warrant between an informant and the defendant does not
violate the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights).
50. Schuster, 684 F.2d at 748.
51. Id.
52. Id. The court concluded that the search was the same as the one to which was originally
consented. Thus, there was no privacy implication resulting from a different government agent
conducting the search. Id. This reasoning is very similar to the reason later developed to justify the
doctrine.
53. United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987). The court applied the doctrine
only when “the agent (or informant) entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to
consent, at that point established the existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search,
and immediately summoned help from other officers.” Id. This is the exact language used in Pollard
to currently define the doctrine. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000).
54. 808 F.2d 645 (7th Cir. 1986).
55. Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459. The court critically noted the “fact that he was assisted by other
law enforcement officers in securing his arrest cannot make a constitutional difference.” Id.
56. Id. at 456.
57. Id. at 456–57.
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consent.58 The Diaz decision began the procession of cases dealing
explicitly with the consent-once-removed doctrine, as defined by this
court.59
The latest and most authoritative decisions on the consent-onceremoved doctrine are within the Sixth and Seventh Circuits.60 The Seventh
Circuit reaffirmed the doctrine twice after Diaz, including most recently in
1995 in United States v. Akinsanya.61 In 1993, the Sixth Circuit considered
the doctrine in United States v. Ogbuh, but decided the case was
distinguishable from Paul, the Seventh Circuit case.62 The Ogbuh court
reasoned the doctrine was inapplicable because the informant brought the
narcotics into the defendant’s home.63 Furthermore, the police forcibly
entered the home rather than being invited in by the informant as in Paul.64
Nevertheless, in 2000, in United States v. Pollard, the Sixth Circuit
formally recognized consent-once-removed, relying on Akinsanya.65 In
1996, in United States v. Bramble, the Ninth Circuit also approved the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Akinsanya and recognized the validity of the
consent-once-removed doctrine.66
B. Elements and Parameters of the Doctrine
The elements of the doctrine generally consist of: 1) an undercover
agent or government informant67 entered at the express invitation of
someone with authority to consent; 2) at that point established the
existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search; and 3)
immediately summoned help from other officers.68 Importantly, there is no
requirement for an emergency situation to exist before the back-up officers
enter the premises.69 Thus, the doctrine stands apart from other accepted
58. Id. at 459.
59. See United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995); State v. Henry, 627 A.2d. 125, 130–31 (N.J. 1993).
60. United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2005); Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648;
Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856.
61. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856; United States v. Jachimko, 19 F.3d 296, 298–99 (7th Cir.
1994).
62. See 982 F.2d 1000, 1005 (6th Cir. 1993).
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. 215 F.3d 643, 648–49 (6th Cir. 2000).
66. United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996).
67. Some courts are unwilling to extend the doctrine to confidential informants. See infra Part
IV.
68. Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648; Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856; Jachimko, 19 F.3d at 299; United
States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987); United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th
Cir. 1986).
69. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856 (applying the doctrine while also acknowledging that no
exigent circumstances existed); Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459 (noting that no exigent circumstances were
present, but still applying doctrine).
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exceptions based on exigent circumstances. Under the first element, it is
apparent that the initial consent obtained must be valid to support the
second entry but, as explained above, this consent can be obtained through
deception or a ruse.70 Despite the validity of consent obtained through
deception, the consent required by the first element imposes an inherent
limitation on law enforcement action. The doctrine is predominantly
applied in situations similar to the Callahan case, where the initial consent
is for entry specifically to purchase narcotics; consequently, consent is
limited to entry and not a search of the premises.71 The first officer or
informant who has consent only to enter one room may not enter other
rooms that are not impliedly consented to by the defendant in his offer to
sell narcotics.72 The second element requires the initial agent or informant
to establish probable cause.73 This is usually done through viewing the
drugs in plain sight or actually completing the transaction and possessing
the drugs.74 The imperative of establishing probable cause can be
contentious, particularly when considering the possible extension of the
doctrine to confidential informants.75
The operation of the third element is the crux of the doctrine because it
marks the point at which uninvited individuals enter the home. It also has
the potential to implicate serious constitutional issues because the actions
of the back-up officers can create further privacy compromises. First, in
order to satisfy the third element, one may question whether the initial
70. See supra Part II.B.
71. See United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 n.1 (6th Cir. 2005) (noting the doctrine is
based on consent to enter the home and not to search). See generally Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 855
(giving consent to informant to enter for drug transaction); Diaz, 814 F.2d at 456 (admitting
undercover agent for purchase of narcotics only); Paul, 808 F.2d at 646 (giving consent to
informant to enter and purchase drugs).
72. Even though police officers may receive valid consent from an individual to enter or
search a home, that entrance or search can still be subject to limits. LAFAVE, supra note 25,
§ 8.1(c), at 19. Police are constrained by the limit that is expressly given to them by the individual.
Id. (citing MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 240.3 (1975)). The Court in
Florida v. Jimeno held that the scope of consent is determined through a standard of objective
reasonableness, that is, what a reasonable person would believe the limits of the consent were. 500
U.S. 248, 249 (1991). In the context of consent gained through deception, the scope of consent is
typically understood through the express purpose for the visit. In consent-once-removed cases, the
express purpose is to purchase narcotics and thus the officer or informant is limited to areas that are
reasonably within that purpose. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996)
(“[T]he . . . agents remained in the area where [defendant] had invited them and acted only for the
purpose for which they had been invited, i.e., to conduct an illegal transaction.”).
73. Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648.
74. See id. (recognizing that the officer had probable cause to arrest upon seeing the drug
containers); United States v. Samet, 794 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D. Va. 1992) (recognizing that
probable cause was established through undercover agent receiving the narcotics from defendant);
State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 128 (N.J. 1993) (establishing probable cause through completion of
drug transaction).
75. See infra Part IV.
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officer or informant must stay on the premises during the arrest. It is
generally considered much safer to allow the undercover officer or
informant to leave the premises before arresting the defendant.76 Therefore,
many undercover operations involve the agent or informant establishing
probable cause and then leaving under the guise of retrieving money.77 In
these situations the apparent rule is that the momentary exit of the agent or
informant does not render the doctrine inapplicable.78 However, the rule
can be contingent upon the agent or informant maintaining an express or
implied right to reenter. If the informant or agent leaves the residence with
no implied right to reenter the doctrine can be inapposite depending on the
time in between and the location of the subsequent arrest.79
76. Edward M. Hendrie, Consent Once Removed, THE FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL., Feb.
2003, at 24, 26; see also Henry, 627 A.2d at 130 (reasoning that removal of undercover agent was
justified on safety grounds because “weapons are usually found where illegal drugs are sold”).
77. See United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d 852, 854–55 (7th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 457 (7th Cir. 1987); Fidalgo v. State, 659 So. 2d 290, 292 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994);
Lawrence v. State, 388 So. 2d 1250, 1252 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980); Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 765
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
78. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d at 856 (holding that momentary exit does not matter because the
initial consent acted as a substitute for a warrant); Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459 (stating “the fact that
[undercover agent] momentarily stepped out to obtain help from other officers in making the arrest
did not vitiate this consent”); United States v. Santiago, Nos. 92 CR 881-1, 881-2, 1993 WL 75140,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993) (allowing the application of the doctrine despite the exit of the
confidential informant); Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990)
(holding “an officer’s momentary exit to secure back up does not invalidate an otherwise legal
arrest”). But see United States v. Herrera-Corral, No. 01 CR 141, 2002 WL 69491, at *1, 7, 9 (N.D.
Ill. Jan. 17, 2002). In Herrera, a confidential informant entered the defendant’s apartment with
consent and observed narcotics. Id. at *1. Thereafter, the informant left the apartment under the
premise of collecting money and confirmed to waiting law enforcement agents the existence of the
narcotics. Id. The informant then definitively left the scene and approximately two minutes later,
law enforcement forcibly entered the defendant’s apartment and arrested the defendant. Id. The
court held that the third requirement of the consent-once-removed doctrine—“immediately
summoned help from other officers”—was not met for two reasons. Id. at *7. First, the court treated
the absence of the confidential informant during the arrest as nearly dispositive. Id. The court
reasoned that the primary justification for the doctrine is to facilitate protection of the undercover
officer or informant and thus, the absence of the informant obviates the primary purpose of the
doctrine. Id. Second, the court restrictively defined “immediately” as only encompassing instances
illustrated in Diaz and Akinsanya, that is where “the [confidential informant] or agent exited the
premises momentarily, or at the same time that agents entered the apartment.” Id. at *9.
79. See Smith v. State, 857 A.2d 1224, 1231–32 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2004). In Smith, the
undercover agent was invited into the home of the defendant to purchase narcotics, and the agent
completed the transaction and then left to inform the back-up team of the completion. Id. The court
distinguished the instant case from that of Baith v. State, in which the concept of consent-onceremoved was applied, though not explicitly adopted, in two respects. Id. at 1231. First, the
transaction was completed and the undercover agent had no expected and implicit right to return.
Id. Second, when the arrest team arrested the defendant he was already outside his home and on a
public street, this gave them no right to enter the premises and obtain the narcotics. Id. The court
further noted that the doctrine is not applicable in these situations because the specific language of
the third element requires that the back-up officers assist in the arrest. Id. at 1232. Thus, if the
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Second, even if the officer may leave momentarily, the length of time
between the transaction and the arrest can potentially invalidate the backup officers’ authority to enter. Relatively few decisions have dealt
specifically with a prolonged time period between the transaction and the
arrest. In State v. Henry, the Supreme Court of New Jersey determined that
fifteen to twenty minutes was not long enough to vitiate the consent
obtained by the undercover officer.80 The court reasoned that the delay
between the two entries was relatively brief and, thus, the circumstances
that originally established the probable cause had likely not dissipated.81
Similarly, the court in United States v. Santiago held that a fifteen minute
respite was sufficiently “immediate” under the doctrine.82 However, in
United States v. Herrera-Corral, the same court redefined “immediate”
and held that a mere two minute delay was insufficient to apply the
doctrine.83 The court specifically relied on the holdings of Diaz and
Akinsanya to determine that the “immediate” requirement is only satisfied
when “the [confidential informant] or agent exited the premises
momentarily, or at the same time that agents entered the apartment.”84
Additionally, a more recent New Jersey case limited the doctrine and held
that thirty to forty-five minutes is too long to maintain valid authority to
enter.85 In State v. Penalber,86 after the narcotics sale was complete the
agent left and went back to the stationhouse to discuss the arrest of the
suspect with the back-up officers who had been present at the initial
transaction.87 The court focused on the language in Henry that the separate
entries must be “‘of a single, continuous, and integrated police action and
were not interrupted or separated by an unduly prolonged delay.’”88
Because thirty to forty-five minutes had passed and the officers left the
scene of the transaction, the court reasoned that the continuity requirement
defendant was already arrested outside, there is no justification of the warrantless entry of back-up
officers in the home. Id.; see also People v. Finley, 687 N.E.2d 1154, 1160–61 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
The court in Finley declined to apply the doctrine to the instant situation because, among other
things, the informant left the house and gave the signal to arrest with no apparent right to reenter.
Finley, 687 N.E.2d at 1160–61. The court distinguished its case by pointing at the Seventh Circuit
cases that did apply the doctrine, stating “[i]mportantly, the defendant understood that the informant
would leave to obtain the money from his ‘buyer’ and would return to the defendant’s premises.”
Id. at 1160.
80. 627 A.2d 125, 129–30 (N.J. 1993).
81. Id. The court also relied on the safety intentions of the police to remove the undercover
agent and prevent undue risk in the arrest as well as on the language in Diaz that allowed the agent
to momentarily step out to request back-up. Id.
82. Nos. 92 CR 881-1, 881-2, 1993 WL 75140, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993).
83. No. 01 CR 141, 2002 WL 69491, at *9 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2002).
84. Id.
85. State v. Penalber, 898 A.2d 538, 542 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006).
86. Id.
87. Id. at 541.
88. Id. at 542 (quoting State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 131 (N.J. 1993)).
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established in Henry was not achieved and consent-once-removed was
unjustified.89
C. Justification for the Doctrine as to Undercover Officers
The consent-once-removed doctrine as it applies to undercover officers
has survived enough judicial scrutiny for its justifications to be considered
valid. Using the basic concepts outlined in Part II, this Part illustrates the
various justifications that have led to the establishment of the doctrine. It is
helpful to first introduce these concepts in the context of an undercover
officer and then compare them to the possibility of extending the doctrine
to confidential informants.
1. Who Needs Privacy When You Have Drugs?
One justification for applying the doctrine to undercover officers is that
the individual's privacy interest is eliminated and no longer reasonable
once the individual brandishes his contraband to the police.90 The court in
Henry discussed the privacy interests involved in the drug transaction
between the defendant and an undercover officer.91 Relying on United
States v. Lewis, the court stated that “[b]ecause [the] defendant had plainly
opened her home to commercial drug traffic . . . her complaint now that
some of her supposed customers invaded the sanctity of her home appears
flimsy.”92 This disregard for the privacy complaints of the guilty underlies
most decisions that have applied the consent-once-removed doctrine or its
concept.93 The Supreme Court in Katz v. United States stated that “[w]hat a
person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is
not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection.”94 Thus, if the drug
89. Id.
90. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 649 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Paul, 808
F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986); State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 132 (N.J. 1993).
91. Henry, 627 A.2d at 131–32. The Henry case involved an undercover officer approaching
an apartment and knocking on the door. Id. at 126. Upon the defendant answering the door, the
undercover officer stated, “let me get two,” while at the same time entering the apartment. Id. The
undercover officer was then directed to another individual from whom he proceeded to purchase
drugs. Id. After exiting the apartment the undercover officer radioed back-up officers, who arrived
and helped to effectuate the arrest. Id. at 126–27.
92. Id. at 132.
93. See Pollard, 215 F.3d at 649 (“Moreover, the back-up officers were acting within
constitutional limits . . . since no further invasion of privacy was involved once the undercover
officer made the initial entry.”); Paul, 808 F.2d at 648 (noting that “the interest in the privacy of the
home . . . has been fatally compromised” once the owner admits the informant or officer); State v.
Schwartz, 398 So. 2d 460, 462 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981) (applying a similar concept as consent-onceremoved and holding that once defendant engaged in criminal activity with the undercover officer
the defendant could not thereafter claim any violation of expectancy of privacy); Baith v. State, 598
A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991) (speaking about the defendant’s home, the court stated,
“its status as sanctum sanctorum is rudely diminished”).
94. 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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transaction is characterized as opening or exposing commercial activities
to random strangers, there are no legitimate privacy interests to protect.
Furthermore, if the consent-once-removed doctrine is executed properly
and the back-up officers merely assist in making an arrest,95 there is no
illegal extension of the consent and no additional harm to defendants’
privacy interests.
2. Power to Arrest and the Need for Safe Assistance
Courts often rely on the power to arrest and the need for safe assistance
in executing arrests when affirming the doctrine.96 Similar to many other
courts, the court in United States v. Yoon relied on this justification and
even stated that it is the basis upon which the doctrine rests.97 In most
95. See supra Part III.B.
96. See United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996) (“[P]rivacy was
outweighed by the legitimate concern for the safety of [the officers inside].”); United States v. Diaz,
814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987) (“[T]he fact that [the agent] was assisted by other law
enforcement officers in securing his arrest cannot make a constitutional difference.”); United States
v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 548 (7th Cir. 1983) (“[I]f [the officer] was privileged to slip the gun
underneath his jacket and leave the apartment we think he was also privileged to have a police
escort to prevent interference by [the defendant].”); id. (holding, in a situation not applying the
doctrine in name, that “[t]he fact that [the officer] got help from other officers in removing the
submachine gun can make no difference”); United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir.
1981) (holding, while not applying the doctrine in name, that consent was part of an ongoing
investigation and entry was permissible even where consent was obtained through deceit); Fidalgo
v. State, 659 So. 2d 290, 293 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994) (stating that since the defendant would have no
constitutional complaint if he was arrested by the undercover officer, it makes no constitutional
difference if the arrest was done by other officers); United States v. Herrera-Corral, No. 01 CR 141,
2002 WL 69491, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 17, 2002) (“An important justification for consent once
removed is the aid and protection of the undercover agent or [confidential informant] still at the
defendant’s home.”); Commonwealth v. Moye, 586 A.2d 406, 409 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (“[I]n this
instance I’m satisfied that the officer, herself, of course had the right to make the arrest had she
chosen to herself. But the arrest having been made only seconds later by her brother officer or
officers in this Court’s judgment does not alter the facts as viewed here.”); United States v. Samet,
794 F. Supp. 178, 181 (E.D. Va. 1992) (“The arrest did not become unlawful merely because [the
detective], as an undercover agent, first signalled [sic] the arrest team to assist him.”); State v.
Johnston, 518 N.W.2d 759, 764 (Wis. 1994) (“Thus, in terms of Fourth Amendment protections,
the uniformed officers did nothing more than assist the undercover officers who were themselves
lawfully on the premises and who were, as conceded by [the defendant], fully within the law to
arrest the suspects and seize the incriminating evidence they had discovered.”).
97. 398 F.3d 802, 809 (6th Cir. 2005). The court reasoned:
The doctrine, therefore, is not based upon either the exigent circumstances or the
traditional consent exception to the warrant requirement. Rather, it is based upon
the theory that, because an undercover agent or informant who establishes
probable cause to arrest the suspect may in fact arrest him then and there, he
should be entitled to call in the agents with whom he is working to assist in the
arrest.
Id.
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consent-once-removed cases, the undercover officer gains valid entry
through consent and then verifies probable cause by observing illegal items
in plain view.98 At this point, the undercover officer has the authority to
arrest.99 Accordingly, because the undercover officer has the authority to
arrest upon establishing probable cause, the undercover officer should not
be precluded from calling for back-up to assist in safely making the arrest.
This justification rests on concern for the safety of the undercover officer
engaged in the narcotics transaction.100 Not only is it safer for the officer to
receive back-up before making the arrest, but in many circumstances the
safest route is for the undercover officer to remain in his undercover
capacity and allow only back-up officers to make the arrest.101 The
Callahan court most aptly summarized the rationale for the power-to-arrest
argument: there is no constitutional distinction between one officer who
may legally arrest and many officers who may legally arrest.102
3. Reasonableness of Requiring a Warrant
If the elimination of a privacy interest has truly occurred and the arrest
can legally be made, one may question why a warrant is required at that
point. In applying the doctrine some courts have answered simply that the
police actions are reasonable.103 The Seventh Circuit in United States v.
White noted that the purpose of requiring a warrant is to place the
98. See Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648 (“[T]he undercover officer[] entered the apartment at the
invitation of [the defendant] and established the existence of probable cause to arrest when he
saw [another man] pull out the three drug containers.”); United States v. Akinsanya, 53 F.3d
852, 856 (7th Cir. 1995) (“[Defendant] consented to [the officer’s] entry into the apartment; [the
officer] saw the heroin (thus establishing probable cause).”); Paul, 808 F.2d at 648
(“[Defendant] invited [the informant] into his house and down to the basement, where the
marijuana was in plain view.”).
99. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 413–17 (1976) (discussing that the necessary
standard for a warrantless arrest is probable cause); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111–14 (1975)
(noting that when probable cause is established, the officer may arrest).
100. See Hendrie, supra note 76, at 26 (describing the danger of the typical undercover
narcotics purchase).
101. Id. It is also more efficient for future police work to let the undercover officer keep his
status as a drug purchaser or dealer, thus enabling him to go on further drug purchases in the area.
The officer has the authority to make the arrest, but under the circumstances the most efficient and
safest method may be to allow others to arrest. Id.
102. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 897 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds,
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). Despite the fact that the court was dealing with a
confidential informant situation, it opined that “the consent granted to the hypothetical undercover
officer would have covered additional backup officers without any need for additional exceptions to
the warrant requirement.” Id.
103. Although some decisions that apply the doctrine or its concept do not focus on overall
reasonableness, it remains a justification that some believe clearly supports upholding the action of
the police. See State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 131 (N.J. 1993) (“Under all the surrounding
circumstances, the subsequent entry into defendant’s apartment by the police to effectuate an arrest
was reasonable . . . .”).
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independent consideration of a neutral and detached magistrate between
police and citizen, thereby preventing unwarranted intrusions.104 However,
in the common consent-once-removed situation, the primary intrusion of
privacy has already legally occurred by the undercover officer.105 Thus,
“[i]t serves no purpose to require an arrest warrant where the same
intrusion would occur whether or not the magistrate issued the warrant.”106
This argument focuses on the initial intrusion of privacy by the undercover
officer and puts aside the possible further intrusion of the second entry.107
But, as stated previously, the doctrine has been carefully articulated to only
apply in situations where the back-up officers merely assist in the arrest,108
and the requirement of a warrant would be redundant.
Under this theory, it might be possible to characterize the overall
conceptual basis of the doctrine as a “quasi exigent circumstances and
consent” justification.109 Although this characterization is not used by most
courts, it is helpful in providing further analysis of the reasonableness of
police actions.110 To recognize a new exigency and to legitimate a
warrantless entry, the government interest and the citizen’s privacy interest
must be balanced.111
The consent-once-removed doctrine routinely is used in situations
involving narcotics and weapons, and in many cases there could be a very
large amount of narcotics.112 The government has a great interest in
removing these dangerous and illicit items from the possibility of
distribution or use as soon as possible. Furthermore, there is an interest in
efficiency, as in all consent-once-removed situations the government can
immediately make an arrest.113 When these government interests are
104. 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1981).
105. Id.
106. Id.; see also United States v. Santiago, Nos. 92 CR 881-1, 881-2, 1993 WL 75140, at *4
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993).
107. The case of United States v. White was decided before the articulation of the doctrine, but
still dealt with circumstances similar to most other cases decided under the doctrine. The court
focused ultimately on the intrusion of the undercover officer and dismissed the second entry by
back-up officers as a non-issue because the undercover officer remained in the apartment at all
times. White, 660 F.2d at 1183 n.3.
108. See supra Part III.C.1.
109. United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 809 n.2 (6th Cir. 2005) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
110. Only the court in Yoon has made this characterization, while no other courts appear to
explicitly recognize exigent circumstances at all in most consent-once-removed cases. Id. at 809
n.2.
111. United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 649 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1519 (6th Cir. 1996)).
112. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
113. However, note the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed that police expediency alone is
no justification for warrantless searches. See Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 897 (10th
Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (citing Georgia v.
Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 115 n.5 (2006)); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 481 (1971).
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compared to the all-but-vanished privacy interest of the individual, the
government interests appear clearly dominant. In other words, the interplay
of the privacy interest and the government interest results in a
determination that the actions by the police are reasonable. The initial
privacy interest is diminished through the valid consent and the remaining
interest is outweighed by the legitimate government interest of safety.114
IV. EXTENSION OF THE DOCTRINE TO CONFIDENTIAL
INFORMANTS
If the previous discussion referring to undercover officers did not
provide much controversy, the extension of the doctrine to confidential
informants will unquestionably incite debate. Few courts have been
challenged with determining the constitutionality of applying the doctrine
to confidential informants.115 But, when presented with the issue, a
vigorous debate has ensued over its viability. These debates depend much
on what each individual court views as the conceptual basis for the
doctrine. When extending the doctrine, courts ultimately conclude that
there is no recognizable difference between an informant and an officer.116
While when rejecting the doctrine’s extension, opponents argue that
extension does not afford the requisite protection to the homeowner
intended by the Supreme Court in Payton v. New York.117 Dissenting
opinions point specifically to drastic differences between an undercover
officer and a civilian informant.118 This Part thoroughly analyzes the main
arguments for and against extension and illustrates why extension is
ultimately constitutional. This constitutionality is based upon a confluence
of factors: the diminished privacy interest of the defendant, the informant’s
power to arrest, and the informant’s adoption into the investigation.

114. The court in Bramble cited the government interest as concern for the safety of the
undercover officer. The court stated that this interest outweighed any remaining expectation of
privacy by the defendant. United States v. Bramble, 103 F.3d 1475, 1478 (9th Cir. 1996).
115. For more on the status of the doctrine and the outcomes of those decisions, see infra Part
IV.A.
116. See United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 811 (6th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no justifiable
distinction between the undercover officer’s and an informant’s ability to call upon the police to aid
in the arrest.”); United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986) (“It makes no difference
that the owner does not know he is dealing with an informant.”).
117. See United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 650 (6th Cir. 2000) (Jones, J., dissenting)
(finding that the government has not shown that “any legitimate government interests purportedly
vindicated by the ‘consent once remove [sic] doctrine’ override [the defendant’s] privacy
expectations”).
118. Dissenting opinions also point out that the search of the home and exceptions to it are not
taken lightly. The dissenting judge in Yoon stated, “[T]he [Supreme Court] has often heard, and
steadfastly rejected, the invitation to carve out further exceptions to the warrant requirement for
searches of the home.” Yoon, 398 F.3d at 811 (Gilman, J., dissenting) (quoting Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 192 (1990)).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

17

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5

510

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

A. Present Status of Extension to Confidential Informants
As defined in United States v. Diaz,119 the consent-once-removed
doctrine has been expressly extended to confidential informants in both the
Sixth120 and the Seventh121 Circuits and rejected in the Tenth122 Circuit.
The Eleventh Circuit, in United States v. Schuster,123 although prior to the
terming of the doctrine, also held that consent can be passed from an
informant to a government officer.124 Additionally, the question has been
addressed in lower courts across the country.125 For example, Illinois’s
Second District Court of Appeals applied the doctrine to confidential
informants in People v. Galdine.126 While other cases such as Baith v.
State127 and State v. Fernandez128 have extended the concept, though not
119. United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987).
120. Yoon, 398 F.3d at 811. See generally Pollard, 215 F.3d at 649 (majority opinion). The
defendant in Pollard was arrested after selling cocaine to both a confidential informant and an
undercover officer in the same transaction. Pollard, 215 F.3d at 645. The court’s analysis focused
on the undercover officer’s actions and his ability to arrest and summon back-up; therefore the
extension was not recognized by this case. Id. at 648–49. However, Pollard clearly paves the way
for the acceptance of the extension as it includes “informant” in the definition of the doctrine. Id. at
648.
121. Paul, 808 F.2d at 648.
122. Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds,
Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
123. 684 F.2d 744 (11th Cir. 1982).
124. Id. at 748–49. The informant and the agent entered the premises together and then the
informant directed the agent exactly which room to enter to retrieve the illicit item. Id. at 748. This
situation is similar to that of Pollard, involving both an informant and an agent. See Pollard, 215
F.3d at 645. However, the court in Schuster appears to hurdle some of the discussion of the
constitutional differences between an informant and an agent by recognizing the informant as an
agent of the government, rather than focusing on the informant’s civilian status. Schuster, 684 F.2d
at 748–49. The court stated, “[t]he facts of this case, however, do require us to extend the consent
given to one agent to yet another full-time Secret Service agent.” Id. at 748.
125. See also United States v. Herrera-Corral, No. 01 CR 141, 2002 WL 69491 (N.D. Ill. Jan.
17, 2002); U.S. ex rel. McCalla v. Gramley, No. 96 C 0418, 1996 WL 699629 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 27,
1996); United States v. Jachimko, 905 F. Supp. 540 (N.D. Ill. 1995); United States v. Jones, Nos.
95 C 2907, 92 CR 427, 1995 WL 443929 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 1995); United States v. Santiago, Nos.
92 CR 881-1, 881-2, 1993 WL 75140 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 15, 1993); People v. Finley, 687 N.E.2d 1154
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997).
126. People v. Galdine, 571 N.E.2d 182, 190–91 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). The informant arranged
a narcotics sale with the defendant to take place in the defendant’s office parking lot. Id. at 185. The
transaction did not go as planned and the sale was made in the defendant’s office building. Id. After
observing the narcotics, the informant signaled the back-up officers and they entered and made the
arrest. Id. The court validated the actions by the police by relying on United States v. Paul. Id. at
190–91.
127. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 766 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
128. State v. Fernandez, 538 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989). In Fernandez the
confidential informant was invited into the home to conduct a narcotics transaction. Id. at 899. Once
the informant observed and tested the cocaine he left under the auspice of obtaining money for the
buy. Id. He returned with members of the Metro-Dade Police Department. Id. at 899–900. Although

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol62/iss2/5

18

Sobczak: The Consent-Once-Removed Doctrine: The Constitutionality of Passi

2010]

THE CONSENT-ONCE-REMOVED DOCTRINE

511

explicitly addressing the doctrine.
B. Examining the Differences Between an Undercover Officer
and a Confidential Informant
The consent-once-removed doctrine suggests by its name that the
second entry is justified on a passing of valid consent from one individual
to another. But as previously discussed, this suggestion is misleading:129
most courts justify use of the doctrine in other ways.130 In the case of
undercover officers, courts generally reason that the second entry is the
same as the valid first entry, treating the two as effectively one entry.131
However, it is much more difficult to make this argument for a confidential
informant. One may question whether a confidential informant and an
officer can be considered as one entity, thus treating the two entries as one.
Further, there exists inherent differences between them, namely the fact
that one is an officer of the law and the other is a civilian. Arguments
against extension of the doctrine naturally focus on the effect of these
differences on the previously discussed justifications for undercover
officers.
1. Privacy Interest Remains Compromised
If offering the sale of narcotics to an undercover officer is considered a
destruction of the privacy interest,132 how is an offer of sale to a
confidential informant any different? The logic that applies in the
undercover officer situation equally applies here. As stated previously, the
non-recognition of a legitimate privacy interest in a narcotics sale situation
is largely based on language in United States v. Lewis and its progeny.133
As the Court in Lewis observed, “[the defendant] invited the undercover
agent to his home for the specific purpose of executing a felonious sale of
narcotics. [The defendant’s] only concern was whether the agent was a
never adopting the doctrine itself, the court ruled that a confidential informant could pass consent to
the officers. Id. at 900.
129. At least one court has chosen not to adopt the term “consent-once-removed” because the
term was perceived as “confusing and unnecessary” and generally unhelpful in making a thorough
analysis. State v. Johnston, 518 N.W.2d 759, 765 n.6 (Wis. 1994).
130. See supra Part III.C. But see Hendrie, supra note 76, at 28 ( “[T]he consent once removed
doctrine is not based upon an emergency concern for the safety of the undercover officer or
informant; rather, it is founded on the premise that the initial consent given by the suspect to an
undercover officer or informant can be transferred to the arrest team, justifying their second
entry.”).
131. See State v. Henry, 627 A.2d 125, 131 (N.J. 1993) (“[T]he separate entries can be viewed
as components of a single, continuous, and integrated police action . . . .”); State v. Penalber, 898
A.2d 538, 540 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (holding officers may reenter the premises “if the
separate entries can be viewed as components of a single, continuous and integrated police action”).
132. See supra Part III.C.1.
133. See supra Part III.C.1.
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willing purchaser who could pay the agreed price.”134 This language does
not center on the identity of the supposed customer, but rather focuses on
the defendant’s actions and the reasonable expectations the defendant
would have in those types of endeavors.135 An individual does not
distinguish between an undercover officer and an informant when an
individual agrees to sell narcotics out of his home. Simply put, the
defendant’s privacy interest is vitiated by his actions and not the identity of
the invitee.
Assuming that consent to the civilian informant vitiates the defendant’s
privacy interest for the reasons stated above, the more important question
is: how far does that destruction of privacy extend? The next step in the
doctrine, summoning the back-up officers to make the arrest, can
potentially implicate privacy through the exchange of information from the
confidential informant to the police and the subsequent entry by the police.
However, the Supreme Court has frequently held that the Fourth
Amendment does not protect information provided to a third party under
the assumption that the information will remain private.136 The third party
is free to communicate knowledge to government authorities without
thereby violating any constitutionally protected interests.137 But the
defendant also has the ability to limit the consent he gives.138 The dissent
in Schuster argues that in the informant context the defendant only
consents to the entry of one person (the informant).139 Thus, there is an

134. United States v. Lewis, 385 U.S. 206, 210 (1966).
135. After noting that the defendant has converted his home into a commercial center for
illegal business and thus it is afforded no more protection than if it was done in public, the Court
further stated, “[a] government agent, in the same manner as a private person, may accept an
invitation to do business and may enter upon the premises for the very purposes contemplated by
the occupant.” Id. at 211.
136. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (finding “[n]either this Court nor
any member of it has ever expressed the view that the Fourth Amendment protects a wrongdoer’s
misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides his wrongdoing will not reveal it”);
see also United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971) (“Inescapably, one contemplating illegal
activities must realize and risk that his companions may be reporting to the police.”).
137. See United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976). The defendant attempted to
suppress his bank records when they were obtained by the police through a subpoena. Id. at 439–40.
The defendant argued that the Fourth Amendment protected the access to his financial records that
the bank possessed. Id. The Court found the actions by the government were legal and stated:
This Court has held repeatedly that the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit the
obtaining of information revealed to a third party and conveyed by him to
Government authorities, even if the information is revealed on the assumption that
it will be used only for a limited purpose and the confidence placed in the third
party will not be betrayed.
Id. at 443.
138. See supra note 72.
139. Schuster, 684 F.2d 744, 749–50 (11th Cir. 1982) (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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implicit limitation,140 and the additional entry of the police is beyond the
defendant’s privacy expectations.141 This is attractive reasoning, but as the
dissent in Callahan notes, it is a fiction to expect that in an undercover
officer situation, consent is ever really given to the police.142 In undercover
officer situations, the defendant always consents to an individual whose
true identity is unknown. The most intuitive conclusion is that the
defendant vitiates his privacy interests when he illegally sells narcotics,
whether he sells to an undercover officer or a confidential informant. Yet
the defendant's diminished privacy interest alone does not authorize the
entry of back-up officers; it merely raises the likelihood of reasonableness
of the warrantless entry.143 The legality of the entry of back-up officers in
the undercover officer context also relies on the need to assist the
undercover officer and on the back-up officer's restricted role.144 Thus,
there still remains the need for another justification to supplement the
decreased privacy and authorize the entry of back-up officers in the
confidential informant situation.
2. Confidential Informants’ Power to Arrest and Need for Safe
Assistance
A core feature of the doctrine, as applied to undercover officers, is that
the officer has the ability to arrest the individual at the moment probable
cause is established.145 The back-up officers merely provide safe assistance
and help effectuate that arrest.146 Similarly, most states authorize their
citizens to make arrests when a felony has been committed in their
presence or when one has reasonable cause to believe a felony has been
140. Id.
141. Id. at 749 (“The narrowness of [the defendant’s] consent delimits the extent of the
legitimate expectation of privacy that he agreed to give up . . . .”).
142. See Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 902 (10th Cir. 2007) (Kelly, J.,
dissenting), rev’d on other grounds, Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009). Judge Kelly
explained:
While it is technically correct that [the defendant] never consented to the entry of
police, no one ever consents to the entry of police in these undercover situations;
they instead consent to the entry of someone who might be the police . . . or as in
this case, someone who might be a government agent . . . .
Id.
143. The dissent in Callahan disagrees and would simply allow entry of law enforcement
based upon the eroded privacy interest of the defendant without consideration of any other factors.
Id. at 901.
144. See supra Part III.C.2.
145. See supra Part III.C.2; see also United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 806 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. Pollard, 215 F.3d 643, 648 (6th Cir. 2000).
146. See Pollard, 215 F.3d at 649; United States v. Diaz, 814 F.2d 454, 459 (7th Cir. 1987);
United States v. Paul, 808 F.2d 645, 648 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Janik, 723 F.2d 537, 548
(7th Cir. 1983).
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committed.147 Therefore, in both the confidential informant and undercover
officer situation, the entrance of back-up officers may be justified by the
need for safe assistance in effectuating the arrest.148 As the concurring
opinion in Yoon concluded, after acknowledging that arrest power lies with
citizens, “there is no justifiable distinction between the undercover
officer’s and an informant’s ability to call upon the police to aid in the
arrest.”149
Yet despite its importance, the power to arrest is neither necessary nor
dispositive for extension of the doctrine to confidential informants.150 The
third element of the doctrine asserts that the back-up officer’s scope of
responsibility is to assist the first agent or informant.151 A reasonable
interpretation of this element might conclude that for the back-up officers
to be limited in responsibility and merely assist, the informant must be able
to effectuate the arrest himself. Furthermore, many courts that affirm the
application of the doctrine to informants cite the informant’s arrest
power.152 The Sixth,153 Seventh,154 and Tenth Circuits,155 in their
discussions of a possible extension of the doctrine, have considered the
citizen’s power to arrest.156 However, in all three circuits the arrest power,
although contentious, was not dispositive in determining extension of the
doctrine.157
147. Under the traditional common law, the private citizen was granted the power to arrest for
felonies committed in his presence and felonies based on probable cause, provided that the crime
actually occurred. 5 AM. JUR. 2D Arrest § 47 (2008). In states where common law is in force, the
citizen’s power to arrest still remains, but some states have modified this power through statute. Id.;
see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 837 (West 2008); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 764.16 (West 2008);
N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 140.30 (McKinney 2008).
148. See supra Part III.C.2.
149. Yoon, 398 F.3d at 811 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
150. At least one concurring opinion has suggested that the power to arrest is “potentially
necessary” to support the doctrine. See id. at 810 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
151. The doctrine as defined in Diaz reads: the undercover agent or government informant
“entered at the express invitation of someone with authority to consent, at that point established the
existence of probable cause to effectuate an arrest or search, and immediately summoned help from
other officers.” Diaz, 814 F.2d at 459 (emphasis added); see supra Part III.B.
152. See Paul, 808 F.2d at 648 (“If [the informant] had been a police undercover agent rather
than a confidential informant, he could have arrested [the defendant] then and there . . . .”);
Callahan v. Millard County, 494 F.3d 891, 896 (10th Cir. 2007), rev’d on other grounds, Pearson v.
Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009) (discussing the power to arrest in the possible extension of the
doctrine to confidential informants); Pollard, 215 F.3d at 648 (“[The officer] could have arrested
both [defendants] had he chosen to do so.”).
153. Yoon, 398 F.3d at 807.
154. Paul, 808 F.2d at 648.
155. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897.
156. Other courts that allow a confidential informant to pass consent to the police have not
addressed the arrest power of citizens, but most of these were decided before the specific elements
of the doctrine were articulated. See Schuster, 684 F.2d 744, 749 (11th Cir. 1982).
157. See Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897; Yoon, 398 F.3d. at 807; Paul, 808 F.2d at 648.
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To determine the necessity of the power to arrest one must consider the
language of the third element in the context of privacy implications as well
as overall reasonableness, which is the primary concern in the warrantless
entry of a home.158 The utility of the third element of the doctrine is its
restricting component. This component is designed to ensure the
maintenance of a limited scope of entry and thereby reduce additional
privacy implications. The back-up officers are not restricted to doing only
what the first agent or informant could do (arrest) but rather to entering
only where the first agent or informant could enter. Under this reasoning,
the officers do not harm the defendant’s privacy interest because they were
going only where the undercover officer or informant was already
permitted to go. Accordingly, the informant’s ability to arrest is not
necessary in order for the back-up officers to assist him.
3. The Informant as an Agent of the Police
What is necessary for the constitutionality of extension is the general
adoption of the informant into the police investigation and his use as an
agent of their actions. Confidential informants working as government
agents may potentially face civil liability for their actions in that
capacity.159 This fact, along with the power to arrest, is important because
it makes the confidential informant more like the undercover officer in his
responsibilities,160 and as stated above, the consent-once-removed
doctrine’s constitutionality is partially rooted in the existence of one
contiguous police action.161 On the other hand, the police have further
responsibilities and powers not recognized in informants which can make
their appearance less like that of an officer.162 Powers such as the ability to
seize evidence in plain view and the theory of collective knowledge can be
considered duties and privileges that have been narrowly granted to police
only.163 Even so, these privileges are inconsequential to the confidential
informant’s restricted action in a consent-once-removed situation.
Ultimately, an informant appears all but identical to an officer from the
defendant’s perspective.164 In many undercover narcotics purchases the
158. Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001); Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739
(1983); United States v. Schuster, 717 F.2d 537, 538 (11th Cir. 1983) (Tjoflat, J., concurring).
159. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 902 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787,
798–99 (10th Cir. 1989)).
160. See id.
161. See supra note 138.
162. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897 (majority opinion) (noting that police have other powers and
responsibilities such as the duty to execute warrants).
163. United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir. 2005) (Gilman, J., dissenting).
164. It is important to note the general action expected of an informant in a consent-onceremoved situation is to purchase narcotics and, upon purchasing the narcotics, summon the
assistance of law enforcement. This action does not necessitate any particular skills or
responsibilities besides arguably the ability to recognize the illicit drugs in establishing probable

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010

23

Florida Law Review, Vol. 62, Iss. 2 [2010], Art. 5

516

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62

undercover officer or informant typically remains in his undercover
capacity throughout, thereby further limiting his role and reducing any
dissimilarities.165 As the court in Baith v. State recognized, “[t]he status of
the observer of the crime as a cooperating civilian, on the one hand, or an
official police officer, on the other hand, has no bearing on the observer’s
legal competence to trigger the arrest scenario.”166 The use of an informant
as an agent of police action and his limited decision-making in the
investigation create the most logical argument for extension. The
informant’s limited agency role also refutes the argument some have posed
about the initial consent never really being given to law enforcement.167
The informant is not simply a civilian but rather an agent working under
the close supervision of law enforcement with specific and restricted
responsibilities.168 Nonetheless, the true identity of most informants is
cited by opponents as a reason to limit the doctrine to undercover
officers.169
4. Entrusting the Suspect Class
It can be illustrative here to return to the Callahan case to provide an
important distinction between undercover officers and informants.170 In
that case, Bartholomew, the confidential informant, contacted the
defendant to engage in the sale of narcotics, completed the transaction, and
finally signaled the officers into the defendant’s home.171 But importantly,
Bartholomew was first charged with drug possession before he decided to
become an informant and assist law enforcement.172 Furthermore, he was
intoxicated at the time he acted as an official informant.173 This raises valid
concerns about the capacity of informants to carry out functions normally
entrusted to law enforcement officers.174 Just as in Callahan, confidential
informants are typically criminals or have criminal charges pending against
cause, but this is obviously within the realm of the typical informant. See infra Part IV.B.4. In this
limited activity there is no real perceptible difference between an informant and an officer.
165. See infra Part IV.B.4.
166. Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 767 n.1 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991).
167. See supra note 148; see also Callahan, 494 F.3d at 897.
168. To be a government agent for Fourth Amendment purposes two questions must be
considered: 1) whether the government knew of and acquiesced in the intrusive conduct, and 2)
whether the party performing the search intended to assist law enforcement efforts or to further his
own ends. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 902 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (citing Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787,
797 (10th Cir. 1989)).
169. See United States v. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 813 (6th Cir. 2005) (Gilman, J., dissenting);
United States v. Jachimko, 905 F. Supp. 540, 542 (N.D. Ill. 1995).
170. See supra Part I.
171. Callahan, 494 F.3d at 893 (majority opinion).
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. See Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 813 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
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them.175 The resulting issues that arise are obvious. The determination of
probable cause is squarely in the hands of someone who has little
experience in such an area and one who also has much less
accountability.176 Moreover, because it is commonplace for informants to
receive favorable prosecutorial treatment177 or large amounts of cash to
cooperate with law enforcement,178 the informant’s own self-interest could
result in entrapment of innocent individuals.179
On the other hand, the most effective confidential informants are often
those “most deeply implicated in the crimes being investigated.”180 In the
world of drug trafficking, it is very difficult to obtain evidence without a
decoy181 and the role of confidential informants is crucial in combating the
illegal narcotics system.182 Considerations about entrapment are also
reduced because of the innately close supervision necessary to meet the
elements of the consent-once-removed doctrine. The doctrine requires
officers to be presently located at the scene and prepared to make the
arrest; the informant has relatively little decision-making ability.183
Moreover, the most important questions pertaining to constitutionality of
extending the doctrine lie with assessing the privacy interest of the
defendant and the necessity of back-up officers to assist an informant with
arrest.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the possibility of ruling on the consent-once-removed doctrine
and its extension, the Supreme Court’s recent Callahan decision instead
confined its holding to an assessment of qualified immunity.184 A
175. MALACHI L. HARNEY & JOHN C. CROSS, THE INFORMER IN LAW ENFORCEMENT 10, 32
(Thomas 1960).
176. See Jacqueline E. Ross, Tradeoffs in Undercover Investigations: A Comparative
Perspective, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1501, 1513 (2002) (noting that it is more difficult for police officers
to monitor the actions of confidential informants and that the lessened accountability of informants
can cause some agencies to move away from their use).
177. Yoon, 398 F.3d 802, 813 (Gilman, J., dissenting).
178. See Dennis G. Fitzgerald, INFORMANTS AND UNDERCOVER INVESTIGATIONS 21-22 (CRC
Press ed.) (2007); Thomas A. Mauet, Informant Disclosure and Production: A Second Look at Paid
Informants, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (1995) (citing the federal government’s tab for payment to
confidential informants as $97 million in 1993); see also Baith v. State, 598 A.2d 762, 764 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1991) (noting that the confidential informant had on one occasion previously received
$10,000 for assisting law enforcement).
179. Mauet, supra note 178, at 564.
180. Ross, supra note 176, at 1513 (citing GARY T. MARX, UNDERCOVER: POLICE
SURVEILLANCE IN AMERICA 320 (Twentieth Century Fund 1988)).
181. Amanda J. Schreiber, Dealing with the Devil: An Examination of the FBI’s Troubled
Relationship with its Confidential Informants, 34 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 301, 301–02 (2001).
182. Id.
183. See supra Part IV.B.3.
184. Pearson v. Callahan, 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
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definitive judgment of the doctrine’s constitutionality will have to wait.
Nevertheless, the doctrine’s relative universal approval as to undercover
officers demonstrates the lack of any challenging constitutional issues and
its acceptance will likely continue in this respect.185 However, the
extension of the doctrine to confidential informants proffers legitimate
debate. Presently, the courts in favor of an extension of the doctrine
outnumber those opposed186 and it appears there is a general trend of assent
to the doctrine’s extension.187
Given the diminished privacy interest of the defendant and the relative
similarity of an undercover officer and an informant in the consent-onceremoved situation, the extension should be regarded as constitutional by
future courts. When rights forfeited by a narcotics seller are placed
alongside the incremental invasion of assisting law enforcement, the
reasonableness of allowing extension of the doctrine becomes clear.
Furthermore, many of the same reasonableness factors that led to general
approval in an undercover officer situation equally apply to confidential
informants.188 Firstly, if the defendant’s privacy interest has already been
vitiated, the incoming officers will affect no more than what was already
affected. Secondly, requiring a warrant where the same intrusion would
legally occur whether or not a magistrate issues the warrant serves no
purpose.189 Therefore, the extension of the consent-once-removed doctrine
to confidential informants provides law enforcement officers with an
extremely efficient tool in combating illegal narcotics and its use should be
readily accepted.

185. See supra Part III.C.
186. See supra Part IV.A.
187. Contra Ben Sobczak, Note, The Sixth Circuit’s Doctrine of Consent Once Removed:
Contraband, Informants and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 889 (2008).
188. See supra Part III.C.3.
189. United States v. White, 660 F.2d 1178, 1183 (7th Cir. 1981).
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